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Abstract
The United States Department of the Treasury responded to the Global Financial Crisis with
an economy-wide stimulus package called the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP).
Within the portion of TARP’s budget dedicated to bank investments, about $570.1 million
was disbursed to community development financial institutions (CDFIs)—specifically,
banks and credit unions (depositories)—in a program called the Community Development
Capital Initiative (CDCI). Through the CDCI, Treasury provided capital to CDFI depositories,
encouraged them to lend to small businesses, and promoted other community-oriented
goals. The CDFI depositories issued either preferred shares or unsecured subordinated
debentures to Treasury at low (2%) interest rates for the first eight years, and high (9%)
rates thereafter. Two of the 84 participating CDFI depositories remained in the program as
of October 2020. Only one recipient failed. The financial health of participating CDFI
depositories is viewed to have generally improved after the investments were conducted.
In late 2016 and early 2017, 26 of the participants were allowed to pay back Treasury
capital at a discount usually 7% or 8% beneath notional value.

Keywords: capital injection, Community Development Financial Institution, Community
Development Capital Initiative, Global Financial Crisis, TARP, US Department of the
Treasury

1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering the responses to the Global Financial Crisis that pertain to broad-based capital
injections. Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/.
2 Research Associate, YPFS, Yale School of Management.
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US Community Development Capital Initiative
(CDCI)
At a Glance

Summary of Key Terms

After the Global Financial Crisis, the US
Department of the Treasury created the
Community Development Capital Initiative
(CDCI)
to
serve
low-income
and
underbanked communities by injecting
capital into community development
financial institution (CDFI) depositories.
CDFI depositories were banks, thrifts, credit
unions, and nonprofit loan funds that
Treasury had certified to be eligible for
financial and technical assistance through
the CDFI program. Treasury collaborated
with federal regulators to review
applications, identify eligible and viable
institutions,
fund
them,
monitor
participants, and wind down investments.
The CDCI program was introduced more
than a year after the Capital Purchase
Program (CPP), a larger Troubled Assets
Relief Program (TARP) initiative that
provided capital to commercial banks
during the crisis. Most CDCI funding
represented a revision to CPP investments
that Treasury had already made in banks
and thrifts that were CDFIs—but on better
terms. The CDCI was also the first crisis-era
program available to credit unions.

Purpose: “To provide support to Main Street banks,
thrifts, and credit unions that lend to small
businesses
and
families
in
underserved
communities.”
Announcement
Date

February 3, 2010

Application
Window

February 3, 2010–April 30,
2010

Funding/
Exchanges
Window

February 3, 2010–September
30, 2010

Legal Authority

Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008;
Troubled Assets Relief
Program; Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010

Peak Utilization

~$570.1 million provision of
Tier 1, Tier 2 capital; 84
participants

Eligible
Institutions

Certified Community
Development Financial
Institutions (CDFIs) approved
by Treasury and their primary
federal regulator

Throughout 2010, Treasury purchased
US Department of the
either preferred stock shares or unsecured Administrators
Treasury; various federal
debentures from CDFIs, depending on the
banking agencies
type of institution. All participants followed
similar capital restrictions and payment schedules, transitioning themselves back to
private stakeholders within an eight- to 30-year timeframe. Through the CDCI, Treasury
extended low-cost capital while prioritizing taxpayer interests within CDFI payment
schedules.
Summary Evaluation
Treasury did not announce a maximum investment amount, allocated $780.2 million, and
ultimately disbursed approximately $570.1 million to 84 institutions, 36 banks and thrifts
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and 48 credit unions, through the CDCI program. As of October 2020, 82 of the original 84
institutions had exited the CDCI program: 54 fully repaid, 26 repurchased early, one went
into bankruptcy, and one exited through a merger. Of the two remaining institutions, both
partially repaid and one partially repurchased early. The outstanding balance stood at
nearly $1 million, less than 1% of the original disbursement. Due to write-offs, the CDCI is
currently estimated to fall $70 million short of full-redemption value—given Treasury
assumptions about market risks. Participants showed generally improved financial health
after receiving Treasury investments. In late 2016 and early 2017, 26 of the participants
could pay back Treasury capital at a discount usually at 7% or 8% below notional value.
Treasury was criticized for exhibiting poor communication by equivocating the program’s
objectives—a general criticism of TARP—and failing to collect regular information from the
participants themselves. Though the program is largely over, there is still a need for more
scholarship.
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United States Context 2009–2010
GDP
$14,628.0 billion in Q4 2009
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to
$15,240.8 billion in Q4 2010
USD)
GDP per capita
$47,100 in 2009
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to
$48,468 in 2010
USD)
As of Q4, 2009:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
Sovereign credit rating
(five-year senior debt)
As of Q4, 2010:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
$9,789.1 billion in
total assets in 2009
Size of banking system
$9,292.3 billion in
total assets in 2010
Size of banking system as a
66.9% in 2009
percentage of GDP
61.0% in 2010
Assets equal to 30.2%
Size of banking system as a percentage of
of financial system in 2009
financial system
Assets equal to 28.5%
of financial system in 2010
44.3% of total banking assets
in 2009
Five-bank concentration of banking system
46.0% of total banking assets
in 2010
19.0% of total banking assets
in 2009
Foreign involvement in banking system
16.0% of total banking assets
in 2010
0% of banks owned by the state
Government ownership of banking system
in 2010
100% insurance on deposits up
to $100,000 for 2007
Existence of deposit insurance
100% insurance on deposits up
to $250,000 for 2010
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation.
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Overview

Background
In 1994, Congress passed the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory
Improvement Act, which established the Community Development Financial Institution
(CDFI) Fund (CDFI Fund n.d.-a). The US Department of Treasury uses the CDFI Fund to
promote local economic development by providing financial and technical assistance to
financial institutions that Treasury has certified as CDFIs (CDFI Fund n.d.-d). CDFI
certification requires institutions to conduct at least 60% of lending and other economic
development activities in areas underserved by traditional financial institutions (Treasury
2010i). CDFIs can be regulated banks, credit unions, or nonprofit loan funds. Treasury
financial assistance can be in the form of loans, grants, equity investments, deposits, and
credit union shares, which CDFIs are required to match dollar-for-dollar with nonfederal
funds (CDFI Fund n.d.-a). Currently, there are more than 1,000 CDFIs located throughout
the United States (CDFI Fund n.d.-c).
By late 2008, the Global Financial Crisis was in full swing in the United States. On October 3,
2008, President George W. Bush signed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA),
which granted Congress the authority to purchase troubled assets from financial
institutions (EESA 2008, sec. 3). Within the EESA, the Troubled Assets Relief Program
(TARP) initially granted Treasury $700 billion—an amount that was later reduced to $475
billion, after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act on July 21, 2010 (Dodd-Frank 2010). Treasury disbursed public funds into five
program areas: credit markets, the automotive industry, struggling homeowners, the
insurance corporation American International Group (AIG), and the banking sector
(Treasury 2016c). Of the $250 billion of TARP funds disbursed to the banking sector,
$780.2 million was allocated to the Community Development Capital Initiative (CDCI)
(SIGTARP 2010c).
In launching the CDCI, Treasury officials emphasized its focus on local financial institutions
and their customers. “It’s a common misconception that TARP funds only went to large
Wall Street firms, but the CDCI program is yet another example of how TARP is providing
critical assistance to Main Street financial institutions,” noted Herbert Allison, Treasury
assistant secretary for financial stability (Treasury 2010i). The CDCI arrived at a time when
private capital had receded from community development financial institutions’ primary
funding sources—banks, foundations, and socially motivated investors (Barr 2010). Donna
J. Gambrell, director of Treasury’s CDFI Fund, remarked, “At a time when many institutions
have pulled back, CDFIs have actually increased their lending and investments in
underserved communities. These CDCI investments will enable community banks, thrifts,
and credit unions to spur economic development in the communities that have been hit
hardest by the economic downturn” (Treasury 2010i). At the onset of the program,
Treasury framed its recapitalization of CDFI depositories as an effort to reach their lowincome and underbanked clients (Treasury 2010i).
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Though Treasury’s initial language suggested that the program was meant to impact the
participants’ underlying communities via lending and investment, Treasury later revised its
wording and claimed that the program was meant to help institutions achieve their
individual economic development goals (GAO 2011; Treasury 2010i). The government’s
rhetorical inconsistencies throughout the lifespan of the program—combined with weak
participant reporting—made it difficult to assess the ex post benefits and drawbacks of the
capital injections. Treasury’s goalpost-shifting is described in greater detail within the
“Evaluation” section of the case study.
Program Description
Treasury first announced the CDCI on February 3, 2010 (Treasury 2010h). Since its
origination, the CDCI was presented as a complement to the already running Capital
Purchase Program (CPP), a TARP initiative that extended “capital to viable financial
institutions of all sizes throughout the nation” (Treasury 2016b). In the initial press
release, the CDCI was referred to as a “TARP enhancement,” and its capital terms
(dividend/interest rates, step-up clauses, diversity of eligible institutions) were explicitly
framed as more favorable than those of the CPP (Treasury 2010h). CDCI eligibility
extended to CPP participants that were certified CDFI depositories and sought lower-cost
capital. Treasury and Government Accountability Office (GAO) frequently combined CDCI
and CPP data in public documents.
Treasury allocated $780.2 million for the program and held an application window
between February 3 and April 30, 2010—an end date that was pushed back from April 2
(SIGTARP 2010c). Transactions took place between February 3 and September 30, 2010
(Treasury 2010i). These purchases were conducted with Treasury funds, and the CDFI
liabilities and equity were kept on the federal government’s balance sheet (Massad and
Kashkari 2018).
To review applications and actively monitor its capital injections, Treasury partnered with
one or more federal regulators: the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC),
National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), and Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)
(Treasury 2010a).3 These partnerships were necessary because different financial
institutions fell under the jurisdiction of different federal regulators (Treasury 2010a).
The CDCI channeled public funds to CDFI banks and credit unions (depositories). According
to this case study’s external reviewer, most CDFIs are nondepositories, so the CDCI was
available to a minority subset of the total number of CDFIs at the time that the program
was announced. Eligible institutions for the CDCI were US financial institutions certified as
CDFIs by Treasury’s CDFI Fund and regulated by a federal banking or credit union agency
(Treasury 2010a). If an institution was eligible, the relevant federal regulator made a
recommendation to Treasury about the institution’s financial viability prior to the CDCI
investment (Treasury 2012a). The regulator also considered in its viability assessment any
private capital raised in conjunction with the CDCI capital injection (Treasury 2012a). Upon
receiving applications, Treasury discussed the CDFI depository’s eligibility and viability
with the primary regulator to either deny or accept the application.
Under §312 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the Office of Thrift
Supervision merged with the OCC, the Fed, the FDIC, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (DoddFrank 2010). Though the OTS was listed in the original CDCI documentation, its CDCI responsibilities were
spread across the other regulators upon the OTS merger.
3

791

US Community Development Capital Initiative (CDCI)

Kulam

Participating CDFI depositories were subject to extensive terms and conditions set by
Treasury. As long as Treasury held at least 10% of its initial investment, the CDFI
depository had to allow Treasury (along with Treasury’s affiliates) to manage, evaluate, or
transfer Treasury’s investment (Treasury 2010b). The 10% threshold also entitled
Treasury to examine and make copies of the CDFI depository’s corporate books, and to
discuss the affairs, finances, and accounts with the institution’s principal officers.
In addition to data access, there were several covenants that the participating CDFI
depository had to agree to follow. For example, the participant had to retain its status as a
certified CDFI and needed to provide Treasury with the certification and documents to
verify this status, consent to any Making Home Affordable (MHA) modification made by any
nonaffiliated mortgage servicer, and participate in Treasury’s MHA program under certain
circumstances (Treasury 2010g).
Furthermore, the CDFI depository was not allowed to engage in any mergers or other
significant corporate transaction, subject to undefined exceptions (Treasury 2010g). It also
faced restrictions on common stock repurchases and dividends, including an increase of
the aggregate per share dividend over the immediately prior fiscal year.
Capital terms were similar across CDFI depositories yet tailored according to the type of
institution.
CDCI terms did not explicitly demand any changes to the existing board or management.
However, there were limits on executive compensation and bonuses. CDCI participants
were subject to the same executive compensation bonuses as other TARP participants
(Treasury 2012a).
Treasury’s shares were generally nonvoting. However, except for credit unions, Treasury
retained the right to vote on any authorization or issuance of capital shares ranking senior
to its investment; any amendment to its rights; or any merger, exchange, dissolution, or
similar transaction that would adversely affect its rights. In the event of excessive
nonrepayment of CDCI capital dividend/interest, Treasury gained voting rights and could
place individuals on the board of the CDFI banks or thrifts, banks organized as S
corporations, and mutual banks—not for credit unions, however (Treasury 2010b). If a
CDFI depository wholly defaulted on its debt, the principal and accrued interest were made
immediately due and payable once the “event of default” transpired.
Treasury did not initially have an exit strategy for CDCI investments. The scheduled
increase in interest rates was intended to encourage participants to pay back their capital
by 2018 (GAO 2016a). However, in August 2016, shortly after the Government
Accountability Office noted Treasury’s lack of an exit strategy, Treasury announced an
early repayment program to help it “dispose of its ownership interests as quickly as
practicable” (Montano 2016). Under the program, Treasury allowed participants to repay
their capital at “fair value,” which in practice meant a discount of usually 7% or 8%
(Montano 2016).
Outcomes
Though Treasury allocated a maximum investment amount of $780.2 million, the CDCI
ultimately disbursed $570.1 million to 84 institutions: 27 banks and thrifts, nine other
banks organized as S corporations, and 48 credit unions (SIGTARP 2010c). The initial
application window extended from February through April 2010 (SIGTARP 2010a). By the
close of the application window, Treasury received applications from 56 credit unions and
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37 banks and thrifts; 36 of the 37 bank applications came from CPP participants looking to
exchange capital (SIGTARP 2010b). The total number of credit unions and other non-CPP
participants that applied for CDCI capital has not been made public, as proposals submitted
to primary regulators were kept confidential (Treasury 2012a).
As of October 2020, 82 of the original 84 institutions exited the CDCI program: 54 fully
repaid, 26 fully repurchased early, one went into bankruptcy, and one exited through a
merger. Of the two remaining institutions, both partially repaid and one partially
repurchased CDCI capital early (Treasury 2020).
Premier Bank failed in early 2013 (Treasury 2019c). SIGTARP arrested the chairman of the
board, along with two other board members and the bank president on charges of bank
fraud (SIGTARP 2017). The bank obtained Treasury funds by falsifying its financial data
and misrepresenting information to regulators. Treasury lost $6.7 million in TARP funds,
and the bank’s failure cost the FDIC an estimated $64.1 million.
Of the original 84 CDFI depositories, two credit unions have CDCI investments outstanding,
with total obligations nearing $1 million (Treasury 2020). Total projected losses on the
CDCI are about $70 million—versus $290 million in late 2010 (Treasury 2011b). These
losses came from Treasury reselling the securities below their original purchase price and
from writing off the capital of one bankrupt institution (Treasury 2019c). All other CDCI
capital left Treasury’s balance sheet through full repayment, early repurchase, or a merger.
One of the requirements of CDCI participation was the annual capital survey, which was
intended to capture (via self-reporting) how the CDFI depositories used their capital
(Treasury 2010b). These surveys were subjective; CDFI officials, in their own words,
qualitatively described their use of capital with information not found in objective financial
reports. From the 2017 survey of 19 CDCI and seven CPP respondents, the top cited uses of
capital included: increasing lending, or reducing lending less than otherwise would have
occurred (reported by 73.1%); increasing reserves for nonperforming assets (reported by
30.8%), and holding as a nonleveraged increase to total capital (reported by 11.5%)
(Treasury 2019a). According to the subjective surveys of the participants, the CDCI aided
CDFIs in managing liabilities as well as assets.

II.

Key Design Decisions

1. Part of a Package: The CDCI was created in the likeness of the CPP to complement
the CPP. Independent laws and Treasury initiatives supported small businesses
thereafter.
Most of the funds invested through the CDCI program went to former CPP participants that
exchanged their CPP capital for more affordable CDCI capital (Treasury 2012b).
Furthermore, 10 CPP exchanges qualified for an additional round of investment beyond the
original CPP investment, totaling $100.7 million (SIGTARP 2010c). The majority of
participants in the CDCI program were credit unions that had not been eligible for CPP
capital (GAO 2014). CDFIs run less lucrative business models than mainstream financial
institutions and encounter difficulties in securing long-term, low-cost capital from private
investors in a time of crisis (Barr 2010).
The CDCI copied the CPP’s architecture while softening key payment factors: the CDCI
decreased initial interest/dividend rates from the CPP’s 5% to 2%, delayed the step-up
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clauses from the CPP’s five years (after the original investment) to eight years, omitted the
requirement on stock warrants, and increased the maximum issuance of government
capital from the CPP’s 3% of risk-weighted assets to 5% (GAO 2014).
Outside of TARP programs, the US Treasury also supported small businesses through the
Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, which permitted Treasury to “make capital investments in
eligible institutions in order to increase the availability of credit for small businesses, to
amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide tax incentives for small business job
creation, and for other purposes” (SBJA 2010). Through this act, Treasury launched the
State Small Business Credit Initiative (SSBCI) and provided nearly $1.5 billion to states,
territories, and municipalities (CREC/CS 2016). Rather than directly injecting capital into
financial institutions, Treasury supported state programs that fell into one of five
categories: capital access programs, loan guarantee programs, collateral support programs,
loan participation programs, and venture capital programs (CREC/CS 2016). The SSBCI
funded small state programs, which filled in market gaps left by larger federal programs
(CREC/CS 2016).
The CDFI Fund programs that followed the CDCI varied in their capital mechanisms, which
included monetary awards, training programs, tax credits, grants, and bond guarantee
programs (CDFI Fund, n.d.-b).4
2. Legal Authority: The legal authority for the CDCI was granted under the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.
The CDCI was legally authorized by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008—
specifically Title I: The Troubled Assets Relief Program (EESA 2008). The broad definition
of “troubled assets” available for purchase could extend to unsecured subordinated
debentures and preferred equity if the secretary of Treasury were to secure the approval of
the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board (EESA 2008, sec. 3).
3. Communication: Treasury made CDCI information publicly available and
equivocated the goal of the program.
To communicate the CDCI, Treasury relied heavily on the Internet. Online documentation
was robust, and Treasury website contained CDCI Program Documents, Program
Agreements for all participating institutions, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) about
how to participate, and other announcements (Treasury 2016a). The application guidelines
webpage held hyperlinks to the websites of federal regulators, where the program details
and an application portal were ultimately accessible (Treasury 2010a).5 All of Treasury
files were published in either PDF or Excel files. After the application window closed,

Under §1204 of Dodd-Frank, the secretary of Treasury was permitted to “establish a multiyear program of
grants, cooperative agreements, financial agency agreements, and similar contracts or undertakings to
promote initiatives designed: (1.) to enable low- and moderate-income individuals to establish one or more
accounts in a federally insured depository institution that are appropriate to meet the financial needs of such
individuals; and (2.) to improve access to the provision of accounts, on reasonable terms, for low- and
moderate-income individuals” (Dodd-Frank 2010).
5 Federal regulators, such as the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, advertised the CDCI using the main
policy details of Treasury’s first press release: CDFI requirements, individual participation limits, low- and
fixed-rate dividends, conversion from CPP, and the absence of stock warrants (Treasury/OCC 2010). The
narratives presented by regulators appeared consistent with one another.
4
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Treasury announced the CDCI once more via press release on September 30, 2010
(Treasury 2010j).
The initial response to the announcement of CDCI was mixed because the stated goals of
the CDCI were, at first, unclear. As “early public announcements and congressional
testimony about the program emphasized that the goal of the program was to increase
small business lending,” some prospective applicants expressed concern about the
relevance of the CDCI to their operations (GAO 2011). For example, the National Credit
Union Administration and officials from a credit union industry group stressed that their
institutions did not make small business loans.6 In subsequent discussions with these
officials, Treasury assured applicants that the purpose of the CDCI was “mainly to capitalize
[CDFI depositories] so they could achieve their economic development goals”—irrespective
of the operations of the CDFI (GAO 2011).
4. Administration: Treasury worked with financial regulators to review
applications, to monitor outstanding funds, and to wind down investments.
Treasury relied on primary financial regulators for assistance through every step of the
CDCI’s lifespan. First, Treasury-regulator relationship was beneficial for Treasury. During
the initial application window, potential CDCI participants were required to apply to their
regulators (Treasury 2010a). The primary regulators then curated these applicant pools,
endorsing the best applicants and forwarding them to Treasury for review (Massad and
Kashkari 2018). The combined staff of Treasury and the primary regulators sought to
prescreen institutions for eligibility and viability quickly and fairly (Massad and Kashkari
2018).
The CDCI program also helped primary regulators by strengthening some of the
institutions they regulated. In several instances, the CDCI capital prevented prompt
corrective action from the primary regulators (BCFCU/Treasury 2012; CCFCU/Treasury
2010; CCFCU/Treasury 2011; NSCFCU/Treasury 2012).
Treasury–regulator relationship made it easier for CDFI depositories to decide whether to
apply for funding. The regulators decided whether the CDCI was an appropriate program
for the CDFI in question, so the CDFIs could not expend resources by assembling an
application to Treasury (Treasury 2010a).
5. Governance: Independent assessments on the CDCI were assigned to the US
Government Accountability Office and to the Special Inspector General for the
Troubled Asset Relief Program.
The status of the CDCI program as a whole was tracked and reported by both Treasury and
the Government Accountability Office (GAO 2011). As part of the Emergency Economic
Stability Act, the GAO had to report to Congress every 60 days on the progress of TARP
programs (GAO 2011). Some of these reports described the ongoing status of the CDCI in
fine detail (e.g., discussing the participants’ progress through the entire duration of the
program). Other GAO reports were broad and tangentially discussed the CDCI as one of
many capital programs. Detailed CDCI statistics (number of institutions repaid versus
remaining, amount of Treasury capital outstanding, estimated lifetime cost to Treasury,
It is not clear whether credit union representatives interpreted the CDCI’s initial goal of “small business
lending” as a prerequisite to receive CDCI funding or as a required condition upon receiving CDCI funding
(GAO 2011).
6
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etc.) were included in Treasury’s daily TARP updates in early 2011 and monthly reports to
Congress after December 2010 (Treasury 2011a; Treasury 2011b).
The EESA established the Office of Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief
Program for the purposes of auditing TARP programs (EESA 2008, sec. 121; SIGTARP n.d.).
SIGTARP is a federal law enforcement agency that strives to “prevent fraud and abuse,
identify wasteful spending, and drive improvements” (SIGTARP n.d.). SIGTARP’s quarterly
reports contain financial data on the current status of Treasury’s outstanding investments,
TARP-related crime, and SIGTARP’s ongoing recommendations for Treasury’s programs
(SIGTARP 2014). These reports contain CDCI investment summaries, details of missed
dividend payments, terms of senior securities and dividends, and a history of Treasury’s
CDCI contract enforcement (SIGTARP 2014).
6. Relevant Regulatory Changes: National Credit Union Administration changed
several rules regarding secondary capital to accommodate low-income credit
unions (LICUs) that sought capital under the CDCI.
Treasury announced the CDCI on February 3, 2010, and on February 19, the National Credit
Union Administration published several interim rule changes regarding secondary capital.
The alterations were meant to harmonize NCUA regulations with CDCI terms and to head
off regulatory barriers to participation faced by low-income credit unions. The new rules
became effective September 23, 2010—one week before the CDCI’s funding/exchanges
window closed. An industry associate remarked, “Without NCUA’s rapid and well-fashioned
regulatory changes, CDCI would never have worked for credit unions” (Rosenthal 2012).
The first interim rule relaxed redemption schedule limits for secondary capital obtained
through government programs (NCUA 2010). According to 12 CFR § 701.34(d)(3), LICUs
could begin to redeem secondary capital (limited to 20% of the original balance) only when
the secondary capital accounts had less than five years of maturity left (NCUA n.d.). The
limit on redemption amount increased as the remaining maturity on the account decreased.
However, CDCI injected capital with 13 years of maturity, and a step-up clause kicked in at
the eighth year. Therefore, subsection (d)(3) would have prevented CDCI’s LICU
participants from repaying Treasury until after the step-up clauses had kicked in. The
NCUA’s new rule, 12 CFR § 701.34(d)(4), exempted LICUs receiving capital under CDCI
from subsection (d)(3), allowing LICUs to repay the government (and any of the
government’s co-investors) in any amount after the first two years of investment.
Subsection (d)(4)’s general language also applied to future government programs (NCUA
2010).
The second interim rule altered loss distribution procedures for secondary capital
accounts, allowing LICUs two methods to subordinate matching secondary capital to
government capital provided under the CDCI (NCUA 2010). The purpose was to ensure that
the government’s CDCI investment was senior to—and would absorb losses only after—all
other secondary capital. This rule’s language was specific to CDCI and did not apply to
other government programs.
The finalized interim rules also contained several technical adjustments. For secondary
capital accounts with less than five years’ maturity, LICUs were required to report net asset
value equal to the lesser of: “(1.) the remaining balance of the account after early
redemption and losses; or (2.) the declining percentage calculations set forth in the networth schedule that are based on the original balance of the account” (NCUA n.d.). The
NCUA included this accounting clarification to avoid a scenario in which LICUs that had
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partially redeemed CDCI capital could be forced to overstate the net-worth value of the
corresponding secondary capital account (NCUA 2010).
7. Term: The application window for the CDCI was three months.
The application window for the program was about three full months: February 3 through
April 30, 2010 (Treasury 2012a). This window was short because the CDCI needed to be
fully functional within TARP’s disbursement period; Treasury’s funding authority expired
on October 3, 2010 (Treasury 2010i). Treasury established the application window with
the knowledge that it had a few months (May through September 2010) for application
review, funding, and exchanges (Treasury 2012a).
8. Eligible Institutions (1): Federally regulated US CDFI depositories were eligible
to apply, but Treasury and the regulators selected which ones could participate
in the CDCI, depending on the depository’s viability.
The CDCI was available to “banks, savings associations, bank holding companies, savings
and loan companies (which engage in solely or predominantly in activities that are
permitted for financial holding companies over relevant law), and federally insured lowincome designated credit unions” (Treasury 2012a). The basic premise of the CDCI was a
securities sale from a CDFI depository to Treasury, and the primary regulator facilitated
the transaction at every step. The CDFI first discussed capital needs and the
appropriateness of the CDCI with its primary regulator (Treasury 2010a). Then, the CDFI
applied to its primary regulator (through the primary regulator’s website), which then
decided whether to pass the CDFI’s application on to Treasury. Upon receiving applications,
Treasury discussed the CDFI’s eligibility and viability with the primary regulator to either
deny or accept the application. For state-regulated credit unions, eligibility and viability
were decided jointly by state and federal regulators (Treasury 2012a).
All TARP applicants were evaluated comprehensively, and overall CDFI financial health was
assessed by capital, assets, management, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to risk (socalled “CAMELS” ratings) (Massad and Kashkari 2018). Total application numbers for the
CDCI are unknown.7 If the CDFI depository agreed to Treasury’s terms and conditions
(including Treasury authority consistent with other TARP legislation), a contract was
drawn and signed to commence the sale. Treasury document language does not indicate
that the CDFI applicant had room to negotiate funding after receiving preliminary
acceptance (Treasury 2010a; Treasury 2012a). Thereafter, the CDFI depository had to
comply with Treasury’s additional reporting requirements and financial restrictions, in
addition to the rules issued by the primary regulator.
Several CDFI executives, lawyers, and industry insiders reported that the application
process was challenging (Guggenheimer 2011). They stressed that TARP’s terms and
conditions were designed for large banks, creating difficulties for CDFI depositories that
lacked in-house lawyers or legal expertise (Rosenthal 2012). Consequently, dozens of
Application numbers were reported by some—but not all—regulators. The FDIC reported that it received 64
TARP CDCI applications, forwarded 12 to Treasury, and ultimately enrolled 10 into the CDCI program (FDIC
2011). The Fed reported that 320 institutions applying to Treasury’s Small Business Lending Fund also
applied to refinance TARP CPP and CDCI investments, yet 137 were ultimately approved for CPP/CDCI (BGFR
2012). The NCUA reported that 111 credit unions applied to the NCUA for CDCI funding (NCUA 2011). While
it is a challenge to measure exact program take-up, the bottom line is that Treasury and other regulators
denied many applications.
7
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applicants relied on pro bono support to apply to the program and comply with its terms
after they were accepted (Guggenheimer 2011).
It is worth noting that Treasury never listed preconditions that would prohibit an
institution from participating—other than failing to follow the terms outlined in the CDCI
application and documentation. Within the press releases, public FAQ documents,
application materials, and the summary of terms documents, Treasury did not address
minimum/maximum size of balance sheets, the requirement of participation (once an
application was accepted), questions of systemic importance, or any other conditions of
ineligibility.
9. Eligible Institutions (2): Institutions that might not otherwise have been
approved by their primary regulator could reach viability and become eligible to
participate if they could raise capital from private investors, and were matched
with Treasury capital up to 5% of risk-weighted assets (3.5% for credit unions).
In some cases, the primary regulator required CDCI recipients to raise capital from private
markets before they were allowed to secure Treasury funding. As described by Treasury,
the regulator could take into account junior private investor capital raised alongside CDCI
capital—so long as the private capital was an amount at least equal to the CDCI funding
(Treasury 2012a). If CDCI funding was contingent on a private capital raise, the amount of
CDCI funding still could not exceed the CDCI program limits: matching private capital up to
5% of risk-weighted assets (3.5% for credit unions). More CDFI depositories became
eligible for the program because the matching capital provision helped them reach a higher
level of viability than what was possible by private capital or Treasury capital alone
(Treasury 2010h). The private capital raised had to be junior to Treasury capital.
10. Individual Participation Limit: Individual participation limits were dependent on
the type of institution.
The terms of CDCI’s individual participation limits were similar across banks/thrifts, credit
unions, S corporations, and mutual banks (Treasury 2010b). Generally, participants were
required to secure private capital only when mandated by their primary regulator. The
level of public investments via CDCI could not exceed the level of private co-investment,
and private capital had to be subordinated to the government’s CDCI securities. If a CPP
participants wished to exchange CPP capital for CDCI securities, it could do so only after
paying off the dividends/interest from Treasury’s prior investment, and applicants could
not have violated any of the CPP terms and conditions before participating the CDCI. The
maximum investment amounts can be found in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Maximum CDCI Investment Amount by Type of CDFI Depository

Maximum
investment
amount
(as % of riskweighted asset)

Banks/Thrifts
5

Credit Unions
3.5 (could not
exceed half of
the sum of
capital and
surplus)

S Corporations
5

Mutual Banks
5 (after
subtracting
other TARP
assistance)

Source: Treasury 2010b.

Credit unions issued debt in the form of unsecured subordinated debentures, which
qualified as Tier 2 (or secondary) capital, to comply with the National Credit Union
Administration standards (GAO 2014). The dividend and interest rates were determined by
the tax treatment of the given institutions.
Banks or thrifts issued perpetual preferred stock shares (Treasury 2010b). For bank
holding companies and savings and loan holding companies, the preferred stock was
cumulative—meaning that the participating bank had to pay Treasury all dividends owed
before paying dividends on any other securities. For banks and thrifts, the preferred stock
was noncumulative. Dividends were fixed at a 2% rate until the eighth anniversary of the
closing date of the investment and then stepped up to 9% thereafter (Treasury 2010b).
Finally, for banks or thrifts, there were no contractual restrictions on transfers of the
securities; Treasury reserved the right to sell or auction off these securities (Treasury
2010b).
Credit unions issued unsecured subordinated debentures (i.e., debt) with a maturity of
either eight or 13 years from the date of the investment (Treasury 2010e). On the date of
maturity, the credit union paid back the principal plus accrued and unpaid interest. This
debt paid cumulative interest: 2% annually until the eighth anniversary of the closing date
of the investment and 9% annually thereafter (including a 9% default rate on missed
payments from years prior) (Treasury 2010e).
S corporations issued unsecured subordinated debentures with a maturity of either 13
years for a bank/savings association or 30 years for a bank or savings and loan holding
company (Treasury 2010d). On the date of maturity, the S corporation paid back the
principal plus accrued and unpaid interest. The CDCI debt issued by S corporations paid
cumulative interest, fixed at a 3.1% interest rate until the eighth anniversary of the closing
date of the investment and then 13.8% annually thereafter (Treasury 2010d). The higher
rates made up for the fact that S corporations banks do not pay corporate taxes (GAO
2014). Assuming a 35% tax rate, these interest rates equated to 2% and 9%, respectively.
Mutual banks issued unsecured subordinated debentures with a maturity of 13 years from
the date of investment (Treasury 2010j). On the date of maturity, the mutual bank paid
back the principal plus accrued and unpaid interest. As mutual banks also do not pay
corporate taxes, the rates on their debt mirrored the rates on the S corporation debt—3.1%
rising to 13.8% after eight years (Treasury 2010j).
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11. Dividend/Interest Rates: Dividends/pricing terms were standardized across all
participants, and fixed step-up clauses were applied.
All interest payments were on a synchronized schedule (payments were made quarterly on
February 15, May 15, August 15, and November 15 of each year—on the first business day
on/after these dates) (Treasury 2010b).
Treasury did not mandate any call options on the debt or warrants on the shares due to the
EESA’s de minimis exception, which gave Treasury the right to waive warrant
requirements for institutions with Treasury investments of $100 million or less (SIGTARP
2010b).
If Treasury investment was still standing after eight years, the institution was prohibited
from making common stock dividend payments or repurchases.8 For credit unions, no
special dividends could be declared or paid on any share accounts or other capital
instruments. Finally, the CDFI depository could not enter into any transactions with
affiliates unless: (1) the transaction was no less favorable to the institution and its
subsidiaries than could be obtained from an unaffiliated third party, or (2) the transaction
was approved by the audit committee or a comparable body of independent directors of
the CDFI (Treasury 2010b). In addition to the preliminary agreements, data privileges, and
capital caveats, Treasury relied on independent evaluators to track the CDCI.
The step-up clauses associated with CDCI capital were fixed and transparent from the
announcement of the program (GAO 2016a). This increase in dividend/interest rates was
Treasury’s attempt to transition CDFI depositories from public to private funding after
eight years (GAO 2016a).
12. Other Conditions (1): Participating CDFI depositories were subject to various
terms, and the CDCI securities held seniority within CDFI payment schedules.
Any participating CDFI depository was required to “make representations and warranties
described in various Treasury agreements” (Treasury 2010a). Among the conditions of
participation in the CDCI was the requirement that “the applicant (and its covered officers
and employees) agree to comply with the rules, regulations, and guidance of Treasury with
respect to executive compensation, transparency, accountability and monitoring, as
published and in effect at the time of the investment closing” (Treasury 2010a).
In the publicly available “summary of terms” documents, Treasury let applicants know
what data the CDFI depositories were expected to report after receiving CDCI funds
(Treasury 2010b). As long as Treasury held at least 10% of its initial investment, the CDFI
depository had to allow Treasury (along with Treasury’s affiliates) to manage, evaluate, or
transfer Treasury’s investment. Treasury also had the right to examine and make copies of
the CDFI’s corporate books, and to discuss the affairs, finances, and accounts with the
CDFI’s principal officers (Treasury 2010b).

When Treasury purchased preferred shares from banks or thrifts, questions arose regarding what to do
about stock dilution for other shareholders. CDCI literature indicates that one of the acceptable scenarios in
which a bank or thrift was able to repurchase its own shares was if/when CDCI participation diluted share
prices and inadvertently reduced employee benefits as a result (Treasury 2010c). In this case, the CDFI
bank/thrift was able to repurchase shares to offset (but not exceed) the share dilution amount—“consistent
with past practice” (Treasury 2010c).
8
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Treasury reserved the right to request and access the information through the institution’s
federal regulator. While Treasury funds were outstanding, the CDFI depository had to
deliver an audited consolidated balance sheet of the fiscal year, and audited consolidated
statements of income, retained earnings, and cash flows (prepared with generally accepted
accounting principles, or in comparative form from the previous fiscal year) (Treasury
2010b). The CDFI depository was also required to deliver copies of any quarterly reports
given to equity/debt holders. If the CDFI depository was ever audited or received an
assessment on its internal controls, a copy of the assessment had to be delivered to
Treasury as well.
Finally, the CDFI depository had to complete an annual survey that detailed how it utilized
the capital as well as the effects of the capital on its operations and status—this was known
as a “capital survey” (Treasury 2010b). Though there was no language about stress tests or
triage within CDCI documents, all TARP participants were expected to maintain “good
standing” as part of Treasury’s ongoing evaluation of CDCI participants.9
With the exception of credit union capital, the CDCI capital terms required CDCI capital to
maintain seniority over comparable securities issued by the CDFI depository. This
prioritized the repayment of taxpayer dollars amongst other stakeholders.
Banks or thrifts issued preferred shares that were senior to common stock and pari passu
(the same ranking) with existing or future authorized and issued preferred shares, and
senior to preferred shares which (by their terms) ranked junior to any existing or future
authorized and issued preferred shares (Treasury 2010b).
Credit unions issued unsecured subordinated debentures that constituted secondary
capital accounts rather than equity ownership (Treasury 2010e). Credit unions are mutual
organizations whose members are shareholder-depositors (Fay n.d.). As such, they do not
have common equity investors comparable to those in commercial banks. For credit
unions, secondary capital accounts are analogous to common stock, and subordinated debt
is a form of secondary capital (GAO 2014). As secondary capital accounts, the CDCI credit
union debt was subordinated to all other claims against the credit union, including those of
creditors, shareholders, and the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (Treasury
2010e). The CDCI credit union debt was not subject to restoration or replenishment under
any circumstances, and it was available to cover operating losses (that exceeded net
available reserves) realized by the credit union (Treasury 2010e).
S corporation debt ranked senior to the S corporation’s common stock (and any other class
of equity permitted to the institution by law) (Treasury 2010d). The S corporations
subordinated CDCI debt to: (1) claims of depositors and other debt obligations to general
and secured creditors (if the S corporation was a bank or savings association), or (2) senior
debt (if the S corporation was a bank or savings and loan holding company).
Mutual bank debt ranked senior to mutual capital certificates and other capital instruments
authorized under state law (Treasury 2010j). A mutual bank’s debt could be subordinated
to claims of depositors and to the mutual bank’s other debt obligations to its general and
secured creditors, unless these obligations were made explicitly pari passu or subordinate
to the CDCI securities.

“Good standing” refers to “material compliance with all the terms, conditions, and covenants of any TARP
financial instrument, but not limited to, executive compensation requirements, reporting requirements, and
payment of dividends or interest” (Treasury 2010a).
9
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13. Other Conditions (2): CDCI executive compensation was congruent with TARP
legislation.
Participating CDFI depositories with company sizes of one to 25 employees could not
distribute bonuses, depending on the size of the TARP assistance package—with
exceptions for grandfathered bonuses. Stock bonuses could only be paid out in 25%
increments alongside the repayment of TARP funds (Treasury 2010g). There were to be no
golden parachutes for the senior executives (or five most highly compensated employees
after them) if there were still TARP funds outstanding. Senior executive bonuses (and those
of the next 20 highest paid employees) could be subject to clawback if it was discovered
that these bonuses were based on inaccurate metrics. Tax gross-ups could not be paid to
the senior executives (or the next 20 most highly compensated employees). The board had
to adopt an excessive or luxury expenditures policy and post the policy on the institution’s
website. The board also had to create a compensation committee of independent directors
who reviewed and evaluated compensation plans twice per year to insulate the institution
from unnecessary risks, and this committee had to file annual certifications and
disclosures. The chief executive officer and chief financial officer had to file annual
certifications covering compliance with the executive compensation and corporate
governance requirements. If the institution had securities registered with the US Securities
and Exchange Commission, then shareholders had to be provided with an annual advisory
vote on executive compensation (“say on pay”).
14. Fate of the Management: CDCI securities were nonvoting, but in the event of
excessive nonrepayment of dividend or interest, Treasury gained voting rights
and could replace board members.
The CDCI securities were all issued with nonvoting rights. For banks, thrifts, and mutual
banks, the exceptions to the nonvoting rights were class voting rights on: (1) any
authorization or issuance of capital shares ranking senior to the CDCI preferred stock, (2)
any amendment to the rights of CDCI preferred stock, or (3) any
merger/exchange/dissolution/transaction that would adversely affect the rights of the
CDCI preferred stock (Treasury 2010b).
In the event of excessive nonrepayment (any dividend/interest not paid in full for eight
periods), Treasury gained voting rights and could place two individuals on the CDFI
depository’s board of directors—as was the case for banks/thrifts, S corporations, and
mutual banks (Treasury 2010b). Election rights ended when the dividends were paid in full
for four consecutive periods. There were no voting or membership rights whatsoever for
CDCI debt from credit unions (Treasury 2010e). Mutual bank debt was subject to additional
“state restrictions” (any state law that restricted the voting rights of CDCI debt that could
not be modified, waived, or otherwise removed by the appropriate state authorities)
(Treasury 2010j).
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15. Exit Strategy (1): Events of default included receivership, conservatorship, or
liquidation.
If a CDFI depository wholly defaulted on its debt, the principal and accrued interest were
made immediately due and payable once the event of default transpired. If a credit union
defaulted, the National Credit Union Administration placed the credit union into
receivership, conservatorship, or liquidation (Treasury 2010e). For state-chartered credit
unions, the appropriate Social Security Administration conducted this event (Treasury
2010e). S corporations and mutual banks faced similar consequences by their respective
regulators (Treasury 2010d). Bank (or savings and loan) holding companies could declare
bankruptcy and place any major bank subsidiary into receivership (Treasury 2010d).
16. Exit Strategy (2): Treasury considered various exit options but decided in 2016
to enable early repurchases at a discount.
Weighing the CDFI interests while protecting taxpayer investments, Treasury considered
several options for each institution to exit the program. In August 2016, after the GAO
noted Treasury’s lack of an exit strategy, Treasury implemented a program that allowed
institutions to buy back their capital at a discount (Montano 2016).
While Treasury preferred that the CDFI depositories simply paid back the investments in
full, partial repayment was possible if the amount was the lesser of 5% of the original
injection or $100,000 (Robinson 2017). The majority of CDFI depositories paid back by
repurchasing the capital outright.
Treasury conducted auctions as part of its wind-down strategy for the CPP and
acknowledged that this was also an option for the CDCI (GAO 2016a). However, the
possibility of auctions was contingent on investor demand for the securities, the quality of
the underlying financial institutions, and the approval of primary regulators (GAO 2016a).
Debt restructuring was also an option but not with respect to the interest rates on CDCI
securities themselves: “Treasury officials noted that, [as of June 2016], they [had] no plans
to alter the terms of the program’s rates unless a financial institution was distressed and
unable to pay the increased rate. Treasury officials stated that the increases were designed
to encourage institutions to replace public capital with private capital within a reasonable
amount of time (8 years) and were a cornerstone of the CDCI program” (GAO 2016a).
Restructuring was an option only for distressed CDCI participants that were first willing
and able to raise new capital from outside investors (or a merger) (GAO 2016a). Through
the inclusion of a private investor, Treasury received cash or other securities that might be
sold more easily than preferred stock, but the restructured investments were sometimes
sold at a discount to par value. Treasury officials noted that Treasury would approve
restructurings for CDCI only if the terms represented a fair and equitable financial outcome
for taxpayers.
For the purposes of “winding down TARP programs in a manner that balances speed of exit
with maximizing returns to the taxpayer,” Treasury took proposals from CDCI participants
to repurchase their outstanding securities at fair value (Montano 2016). Since fair value
was typically10 calculated at a discount 7% or 8% under the notional value, this provided
One CDFI depository received a 20% discount; M&F Bancorp, Inc. repurchased its preferred shares at $800
per share on December 20, 2016 (Treasury 2019c).
10
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CDCI participants with an incentive to pay back early; without the discount, they would
have a strong incentive to retain the cheap CDCI capital until the step-up date in 2018,
when it would suddenly become very expensive. In November 2016, SIGTARP
recommended to Treasury that it not indicate what discount Treasury would accept; this
would help Treasury ensure the highest possible taxpayer repayment (SIGTARP 2017).
This early repurchase initiative accepted applications between August 1 and December 9,
2016 (Montano, McArdle, and Hall 2016). According to the GAO report released during this
period, each CDFI depository must have proposed to repurchase at least 50% of their
outstanding CDCI securities for Treasury to sign on (GAO 2016b). One early repurchaser,
Arkansas-based Southern Bancorp, described the early repurchase terms as “very
favorable” (Southern Bancorp 2017). By the end of the early repurchase period, 27 of the
57 CDCI participants remaining in 2016 had used it; 26 institutions fully repaid and one
partially repaid their CDCI investments (Treasury 2019c).

III. Evaluation
There are three types of evaluations for the CDCI: (1) CDFI associates and participants
offering anecdotes on the overall attractiveness of the program, (2) SIGTARP criticizing
Treasury’s oversight of the investments, and (3) GAO and a few academics exploring the
effects of the program on participants’ financial health and behavior.
Several CDFI representatives have claimed that the announcement of CDFI-targeted TARP
funds inspired many depositories to pursue CDFI certification, in part, because they wanted
to qualify for CDCI funding (Gambrell 2011; Ratigan 2014; Rosenthal 2012). Treasury’s
CDFI Fund certified or recertified nearly 200 of the then-total 931 CDFIs in 2010, including
95 in the last two months of the CDCI’s application period (Gambrell 2011). Of the 20 banks
that received CDFI certification in 2010, 18 received CDCI funds (Longworth and
Newberger 2011). From the CDCI’s $570.1 million disbursement, more than $500 million
went to CDFI banks—61% of this subset went to CDFI banks certified in 2010 (Longworth
and Newberger 2011). A similar dynamic played out for CDFI credit unions; of the 48 credit
unions that received CDCI investments, 15 were certified during the first nine months of
2010 (Rosenthal 2012). The CDCI’s popularity is evidenced by the high number of
institutions that pursued CDFI certification during the program’s application period, the
fact that almost half of CDCI participants were newly certified CDFIs, and the majority
disbursed funds having gone to newly certified CDFIs.
Heads of CDFI depositories have praised the CDCI because the additional funds allowed
them to extend more credit to their clients. According to interviews conducted with CDFI
banks, they pursued CDFI certification, in part, to qualify for programs such as the CDCI,
which served as a valuable source of capital (Longworth and Newberger 2011). From a
CDFI bank’s perspective, the CDCI offered tier-1 capital at rates that were cheap compared
to other TARP funds (Longworth and Newberger 2011). The relatively low cost of capital
enabled CDFI banks to make loans and investments that they otherwise might not have
been able to make (City First Bank of DC 2010; Longworth and Newberger 2011). Similarly,
several heads of CDFI credit unions suggested that they used CDCI capital to meet
increased credit demand from nonprofit organizations, underbanked communities, and
customers that were otherwise underserved by traditional lenders (Abello 2021; Rosenthal
2012). CDFI banks and credit unions alike recognized that signing up to receive secondary
capital from the government meant more legal fees and interest costs, which they knew
were meant to encourage repayment within eight years (Rosenthal 2012; Surgeon et al.
2020). Though the CDCI’s terms of repayment and compliance made the temporary loan
less attractive to CDFI depositories than grants, which represented permanent equity that
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did not have to be repaid, the CDCI was still appealing because it was a single capital source
much larger than what was normally available to CDFI depositories through grants, fiscal
transfers, and other related programs (Rosenthal 2012).
According to SIGTARP, Treasury failed to enforce mandatory use of capital reporting, so it
is challenging to determine whether CDCI funds were used as intended or not (Rehm 2011;
SIGTARP 2014). Robinson (2017) criticizes the CDCI’s weakly positive effects on CDFI
depositories’ small business lending, but lending was only one of many measures used to
assess CDFI financial health (Massad and Kashkari 2018). Pana and Wilson (2012) find that
credit unions eligible for TARP funds were more likely to participate in CDCI if they were
headquartered in the district of a US House Financial Services Committee member.
Treasury officials who oversaw the selection process say they sought to head off any
political pressure: “all Congressional calls and input were directed to [political appointees]
and kept away from those reviewing applications” (Massad and Kashkari 2018). These
officials suggest that all TARP applicants were evaluated comprehensively, and overall
CDFI financial health was assessed by CAMELS ratings (Massad and Kashkari 2018).
The program’s primary objective was changed from fostering small business lending
(through CDFI depositories) to broadly helping participants achieve their independent
goals. At the program’s announcement in February 2010, it was portrayed as a program to
help “Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) that lend to small businesses
in the country’s hardest-hit communities” (emphasis added) (Treasury 2010h). At its onset,
Treasury repeatedly advertised the CDCI as a program for “small business lending”—a
phrase that occurs several times throughout the initial press release and public messages.
After Treasury heard the concerns of potential CDCI applicants that did not specialize in
small business lending, it revised its message about the CDCI’s objective to something more
inclusive: “to capitalize CDFIs to carry out their economic development goals” (GAO 2011).
After initially claiming that small business lending was the primary objective of the CDCI
(and the primary metric of success), Treasury deferred to CDFI depositories for a
subjective measure of success via self-reporting.11, 12 This shift became an issue when CDFI
depositories failed to report their mandatory use of capital because Treasury did not know
what a large portion (in 2012, the majority) of CDCI participants were doing with Treasury
funds throughout the lifespan of the program (SIGTARP 2014). Treasury relied on the CDFI
depositories to set their own goals, failed to hold participants accountable through
reporting standards that were mandated by CDCI contracts, and did not enforce its own
voting rights after interest/dividend payments were skipped. With respect to the initial
objective, limited research shows that the CDCI did not spur CDFI depositories to extend
more small business loans (Robinson 2017).
In a 2014 quarterly report to Congress, the Special Inspector General for the Troubled
Asset Relief Program highlighted oversight issues in Treasury’s handling of CDCI. An
increasing number of CDCI participants failed to submit the use of capital survey—a
mandatory part of receiving Treasury funding (SIGTARP 2014). Of the 84 CDCI
participants, 14 did not send the annual use of capital survey in 2010, 22 in 2011, and 56 in
2012. “Never once in the history of the CDCI program have all 84 CDCI banks and credit
This notion is reinforced by the absence of any question about “small business lending” in the annual use of
capital surveys (Treasury 2019a).
12 In his exit interview, former SIGTARP Neil Barofsky discusses similar issues with the CPP: “What is
Treasury’s response [to the lack of lending]? They changed the goal. The [new] goal was to make money. The
CPP, according to Treasury officials, by any objective measure was a success. What about the objective
measure that you announced, to restore lending? It didn’t work. But again, if you change your goals along the
way you get to declare everything a success. That doesn’t make it a good government program” (Rehm 2011).
11
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unions complied with the contractual requirement to report annually to Treasury on the
use of their funds” (SIGTARP 2014). If Treasury did not understand the financial decisionmaking of participating institutions, the report went, then Treasury could not offer sound
advice/guidance to help them achieve their subjective goals, or accurately gauge the overall
success of this program (SIGTARP 2014). Former SIGTARP Neil Barofsky complained about
this issue in his 2011 exit interview and suggested that Treasury “should have required
lenders to disclose how TARP funds were used” (Rehm 2011).
Treasury also failed to act consistently on its own right to attend board meetings and
appoint directors in the event of consecutive missed interest/dividend payments (SIGTARP
2014). In the instance of PGB Holding, Inc., the CDCI participant had missed 12 Treasury
dividend payments, yet by April 2014, Treasury had failed to place any Treasury
representatives on the company’s board (SIGTARP 2014). On the other hand, when First
American International Corp. missed enough payments to warrant a Treasury observer at
its board meetings, Treasury requested an observer in February 2013. “The bank rejected
Treasury’s request, but subsequently paid the missing dividends”; Treasury’s intent to
enforce securities contracts led to better compliance. Treasury also sent observers to TriState Bank and Carver Bancorp (SIGTARP 2017).
Despite the equivocation of program goals, some scholars researched the CDCI under the
original premise of small business lending. Robinson (2017) analyzes the financial data of
CDCI participants and determines that small business loan growth is positively correlated
with high levels of bank capital, liquidity, and high ratios of business loans to assets
(Robinson 2017). Furthermore, growth in business loans is associated with declines in
asset quality and increases in profitability. Comparing CDCI participants to minority-owned
banks, the paper concludes that “growth in small business lending is strongest among CDCI
participants, but participation in the CDCI does not ensure stronger growth in small
business lending for any year after participation in the CDCI.”
On the basis of small business lending growth, the paper dubs the CDCI a “failure” and
attributes that failure to the lack of financial incentives to encourage participants to
originate more small business loans (Robinson 2017). However, the study lumps all CDFI
depositors together—rather than focusing on those whose stated purpose was to provide
small business loans—and includes those that specialized in other financial products like
mortgage loans or small personal loans.
The financial health of most CDCI participants improved since they received investments.
Between the end of 2011 and March 31, 2016—a time when most participants were still in
the program—the median of five of six financial health indicators improved (GAO 2016a).13
However, the median of two financial health indicators weakened after December 2014.

13

These indicators include:
(1.) the Texas ratio, which helps determine the likelihood of a bank’s failure by comparing its troubled
loans to its capital and is calculated by dividing a bank’s nonperforming assets plus loans 90 or more
days past due by its tangible equity and reserves. Lower Texas ratios indicate stronger financial health.
(2.) Noncurrent loan percentage, which is the sum of loans and leases 90 days or more past due and in
nonaccrual status. Lower noncurrent loan percentages indicate stronger financial health. (3.) The net
charge-offs to average loans ratio is the total dollar amount of loans and leases charged off (removed
from balance sheet because of uncollectability), less amounts recovered on loans and leases previously
charged off divided by the average dollar value of loans outstanding for the period. Lower net charge-off
to average loans ratios indicate stronger financial health. (4.) The return on average assets measure
shows how profitable a bank is relative to its total assets and how efficiently management uses its assets
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The average institution took about 2,078 days to exit the CDCI.14 After interviewing CDCI
participants, industry insiders, and federal regulators, the GAO offers a few explanations
for the program length: CDFI depositories waited until cheaper capital was available before
returning to the private market and relied on CDCI capital to further expand operations,
and some were wary of current and future (e.g.: Basel III regulatory reforms) capital
requirements (GAO 2014).
According to CCFCU/Treasury capital surveys from 2010 through 2017, of the two
institutions still on Treasury’s balance sheet, each appears to use Treasury for two broad
purposes: to comply with one’s primary financial regulation, and to expand financial
services and products (CCFCU/Treasury 2010 – 2017).

to generate earnings. It is calculated by dividing a bank’s net income by the average of its assets over a
specific period, such as a quarter or year. Higher returns on average assets indicate stronger financial
health. (5.) Common equity tier 1 ratio is a bank’s equity capital excluding any preferred shares, retained
earnings, and disclosed reserves as a share of risk-weighted assets. Higher common equity tier 1 ratios
indicate stronger financial health. (6.) Reserve to nonperforming loans are the funds a bank holds to
cover loan losses divided by loans that are 90 days or more past due. Higher reserves to nonperforming
loans indicate stronger financial health.
14 This number does not include the CDCI participants remaining as of July 2019 (Treasury 2019b).
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Program: Status of Programs and Implementation of GAO Recommendations.” Report to
Congressional Addressees, GAO-11-74, January 2011.
Describes the initial market response to the Community Development Capital Initiative.
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